Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una ontología (...) social al modo en que Searle la entiende (esto es, como una empresa puramente analítica) sobre los desarrollos más específicos de la filosofía moral, social y política. Al contrario, sugerimos que, por lo que se refiere a la realidad social, los compromisos ontológicos dependen de los presupuestos sustantivos que se adopten en relación con la naturaleza y los fines de la sociedad misma, o bien no pasarán de ser un formalismo vacío sin relevancia heurística alguna. [This paper challenges the point recently made by John Searle that there are no positive human rights. We contend that the existence of positive human rights is not inconsistent, as Searle argues, with the notions of "right" and "human rights" as defined in his social ontology. Therefore, one could adhere to Searle's social ontology and assert the existence of positive human rights at the same time. Subsequently, the paper gives reason to question the alleged logical priority of social ontology in Searle's sense (i.e., as a purely analytic endeavour) over the particular developments of moral, social, and political philosophy. We suggest, on the contrary, that concerning social reality ontological commitments are dependent on substantive assumptions about the nature and aims of society itself, or else they amount to an empty formalism with no heuristic relevance.]. (shrink)

In his recent work, "The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy," Hilary Putnam traces the history of the fact-value dichotomy from Hume to Stevenson and Logical Positivism. The aim of this historical reconstruction is to undermine the foundations of the dichotomy, showing that it is of a piece with the dichotomy - untenable, as we know now - of "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments. Putnam's own thesis is that facts and values are "entangled" in a way that precludes any attempt to draw (...) a sharp distinction between "value judgments" and "matters of fact." The idea of an "entanglement of facts and values" Putnam rightly attributes to John Dewey, who - we should add - made of it the main issue in his controversy with Logical Positivism. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the problem whose history Putnam summarizes could bring into light important aspects of it that have been neglected. It is worth reading in this connection the intercourse between Dewey and Stevenson. Secondly, it is striking that Putnam's version of the history of the fact-value dichotomy hardly mentions the problem that caused this very dichotomy to arise in the first place: i. e., the problem of insoluble moral disagreements. By contrast, Dewey's attack on the dualism of fact and value can be read as an attempt to redescribe this kind of disagreements in a way that makes room for intelligent inquiry, and consequently for rational expectations of agreement. The "entanglement thesis" surely is a part of this re-description. But then it must have implications - particularly for the analysis of value-justification - which are overlooked, or by-passed, by Putnam. This leaves the question open whether Putnam and Dewey subscribe to different versions of pragmatism with regard to norms and values. (shrink)

Una de las observaciones más agudas de la Lógica se encuentra escondida en una breve nota a pie de página, cuando Dewey señala el efecto pernicioso de “la literatura y los hábitos literarios” para una correcta comprensión de la relación entre las ideas o el lenguaje y la actividad práctica (LW.12: 55, nota 2). Pocas líneas antes, ha recordado el hecho obvio – pero olvidado con frecuencia por tantos filósofos del lenguaje – de que la comunicación lingüística fue durante milenios (...) únicamente ora... (shrink)

El trabajo desarrollado en este artículo muestra una experiencia docente basada en la Metodología Activa del Aprendizaje Basado en Proyectos en la asignatura de Instalaciones II de la titulación del Grado en Arquitectura Técnica de la Universidad de Burgos. Para alcanzar la excelencia del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje, se ha diseñado una metodología de trabajo basada en el desarrollo progresivo de un Proyecto de Ejecución mediante subproyectos, con el objetivo de conseguir mejores resultados en el proceso de aprendizaje mediante (...) el desempeño personal, la retroalimentación de procesos y el trabajo cooperativo, todo ello orientado a la excelencia académica y profesional de los estudiantes. Los resultados obtenidos muestran que el ABP es una excelente metodología para el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje de la asignatura de Instalaciones II y para el futuro desempeño profesional de los estudiantes. (shrink)

Uno de los componentes más importantes del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje de los estudios de Arquitectura Técnica es la realización de un proyecto final que aglutina todos los conocimientos y competencias desarrollados en las diferentes disciplinas que configuran el Plan de Estudios. El objetivo de esta propuesta es visualizar la evolución del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje en el Proyecto Fin de Grado en los estudios de Arquitectura Técnica e Ingeniería de Edificación de la Universidad de Burgos, mostrando las diferentes adaptaciones (...) de los contenidos y la tipología elegida para su desarrollo. (shrink)

Identity has been widely understood in Western societies as a specular construction that operates simultaneously both from within and from outside oneself. However, this process is fiercely changing in a world in which almost every human action is mediated by information and communication technologies. This paper, from a theoretical perspective, aims to discover the main educational implications of this change. For that purpose, we first consider the traditional meaning and process of forming the self in Western culture. Afterwards, we identify (...) and describe the mechanisms for the construction of the self in our current context, highlighting the fact that technologies, in themselves and regardless of the use we make of them, hide implications. Taking this into account, we show to what extent the current development of the self presents shades, conflicts and tangible risks from an educational perspective. We finally conclude that it is essential to promote an education on technology that goes beyond the use regulation in which, up to now, it has been solely focused on. (shrink)

This article evaluated the effects of an interpersonal skills program based on artistic expressions to reduce intimate partner violence in college students. The research was of explanatory type, quasi-experimental design and used the Dating Abuse questionnaire (adapted by Osorio, 2014), the Interpersonal Skills questionnaire with reliability of 0.81 having as results in the entry test in terms of violence a mean of 88. 16 and after the program was applied it decreased to 81.2, in interpersonal skills the mean of 46.6 (...) increased to 53.3 with large effect size according to Cohen's d 7.889 CI95% (6.246-9.532), statistically significant differences were found in terms of violence. (shrink)

Pocas dudas hay hoy en día sobre la importancia de contar con buenas traducciones y ediciones de textos filosóficos relevantes. Más si se trata de textos clásicos, y más aún cuando las propuestas filosóficas que contienen no manifiestan el punto de vista hegemónico sobre el tema en cuestión. Estas son, precisamente, las circunstancias que acompañan a la reciente traducción al español realizada por Ángel Manuel Faerna de Lógica: La Teoría de la Investigación de John Dewey. No es la (...) primera tra... (shrink)

I defend a Deferred Ostension view of quotation, on which quotation-marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. On this view, the quoted material works like Nunberg’s indexes in his account of deferred ostensión in general. The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the (...) deferred ostension view deals with a problem I pointed out for the identity proposal in my earlier work, that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens (see the examples on p. 261 of García-Carpintero 1994). (shrink)

Social network sites are a new communication channel to convey CSR information. They are interactive channels that let users participate, spread content and generate positive and negative electronic word-of-mouth about companies that can dramatically affect their reputation and future business. To identify the factors behind this behaviour, we designed a causal model to explain the intention to both comment on and share a negative corporate social responsibility news posted on Facebook. We included the following as explanatory variables: social consciousness, environmental (...) consciousness, information usefulness, corporate image and attitude towards sharing and commenting on CSR news. We surveyed 208 Facebook users who evaluated a fictitious news item about an environmental issue. We observed that social and environmental consciousness influences the usefulness of information and the attitude towards behaviour, which may explain the eWOM intention of the specific news. However, corporate image can cause people to refrain from generating eWOM and spreading the news on their friend social network. (shrink)

The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...) disagreement are discussed, and it is argued that, although they help to clarify the issues, they do not fully explain why such impressions remain under enlightenment. To do it, the paper develops a suggestion that other writers have made, that the lingering impression of disagreement is a consequence of a practical conflict, appealing to dispositions to practical coordination that come together with presuppositions of commonality in axiological matters. (shrink)

Foucault plantea que no hay una sola racionalidad desde la que sean pensables todas las dimensiones de la actual complejidad, por el contrario, la comprensión del presente abre el espacio al análisis histórico de las instituciones sociales y de sus procesos, por medio de dispositivos teórico-metodológicos desarrollados por el enfoque divergente del autor, que amplía la reflexión de los procesos de construcción, reconstrucción y modificación de las representaciones y las identidades sociales. Uno de los ejes de análisis es el sentido (...) común, por ello surge la pregunta ¿cómo el sentido común ordena la palabra? y ¿qué hay de amenazante en las palabras de las personas? Aunado, el análisis del discurso saca a la luz el juego de su poder de afirmación de dominios de objetos. Otro eje es el poder, instrumento conceptual para entender, pensar y ordenar el mundo social, a los sujetos y a sus prácticas sociales y culturales. Poder, productor de conocimiento y realidad, que determina las vías por las cuales se construyen las verdades aceptadas en una época determinada. Foucault lo propone como un poder productor, creador de un régimen de verdad que desarrolla un pensamiento sistematizador y racional, lo mismo que creador de subjetividades. (shrink)

En el artículo se caracteriza una clase de relaciones binarias para que éstas puedan representar las comparaciones de enunciados que un agente puede plantear y resolver de acuerdo con su mayor o menor grado de aproximación a la verdad. Con ello se espera poder analizar con mayor detalle el peso que puede terminar teniendo en su evaluación metodológica el grado de aproximación a la verdad de los modelos teórico-económicos. De todas formas, el propósito inmediato del artículo es el de ofrecer (...) una propuesta más general y, sobre todo, mucho más sencilla que las presentadas en otros dos trabajos anteriores del autor. Por otra parte, el concepto de aproximación a la verdad que se maneja es diferente del vinculado con la noción poperiana de verosimilitud.In this paper, we characterize a class of binary relations to represent the comparisons which an agent can make between statements according to their degree of approximation to the truth. This class of relations, we hope, can help to analyse how much can weight the degree of approximation of economic theoretical models in their methodological assesment. In any case, the immediate purpose of the paper is to offer a proposal easier and more general than two other worked up earlier by the author. On the other hand, our concept of approximation to the truth differs from that linked with the popperian notion of verosimilitude. (shrink)

Con este artículo se pretende simplificar la propuesta presentada en un trabajo anterior, prescindiendo como conectiva del símbolo barra de la probabilidad condicionada. Haciéndolo, se consigue reducir a la mitad el número de condiciones postuladas, percibiéndose con ello mejor el lugar central de la condición de superioridad por implicación. También se aborda qué información pueda proporcionar el grado de aproximación de los modelos teórico-económicos sobre lo que vaya a terminar sucediendo en las situaciones empíricas correspondientes, se indican dos formar de (...) ampliar el análisis para incrementarla, y se comenta la aplicabilidad práctica de las comparaciones estudiadas.The proposal about the approximation comparisons presented in an earlier essay may be simplified doing without the bar symbol of conditional probability. In this way, the number of the postulated conditions diminish in a half, and the key role of the superiority by implication property is better perceived. Attention is also paid to what information can be gathered from the approximation degree of economic theoretical models about what may finally happen in the corresponding empirical situations, and to the ways by which this information can be increased. Some comments about the applicability of approximation comparisons are added. (shrink)

Con este artículo se pretende simplificar la propuesta presentada en un trabajo anterior, prescindiendo como conectiva del símbolo barra de la probabilidad condicionada. Haciéndolo, se consigue reducir a la mitad el número de condiciones postuladas, percibiéndose con ello mejor el lugar central de la condición de superioridad por implicación. También se aborda qué información pueda proporcionar el grado de aproximación de los modelos teórico-económicos sobre lo que vaya a terminar sucediendo en las situaciones empíricas correspondientes, se indican dos formar de (...) ampliar el análisis para incrementarla, y se comenta la aplicabilidad práctica de las comparaciones estudiadas.The proposal about the approximation comparisons presented in an earlier essay may be simplified doing without the bar symbol of conditional probability. In this way, the number of the postulated conditions diminish in a half, and the key role of the superiority by implication property is better perceived. Attention is also paid to what information can be gathered from the approximation degree of economic theoretical models about what may finally happen in the corresponding empirical situations, and to the ways by which this information can be increased. Some comments about the applicability of approximation comparisons are added. (shrink)

The participation of families in schools where their children study is a recurring research topic. This field tends to address the perception of parents or teaching staff. This work is novel in that it considers what teachers, and not families, do to facilitate this participation. The purpose of this work has been to contrast a theoretical model with a multidimensional questionnaire designed to obtain information on the assistance provided by teachers to improve parental involvement in schools. It will allow us (...) to lay the foundations for the content necessary for the initial and permanent training of teachers. Then, an initial questionnaire was created and, after being subjected to expert judgment, it was applied to 225 Spanish teachers, using a quantitative and a non-experimental methodology. After calculating the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and applying the structural equation model, a questionnaire was obtained that had satisfactory construct validity and reliability. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and problems of (...) reductionism and enactivism and then we will offer two arguments against this shared factualist assumption: (1) normative vocabulary is ineliminable if we want a complete explanation of our situated practices; and (2) the factualist assumption is a species of the is-ought fallacy. Finally, we will claim that a folk psychological explanation of our normative practices is fully compatible with ontological naturalism when such descriptivist or factualist assumption is rejected. (shrink)

The impact of digital devices and the Internet has generated various changes at social, political, and economic levels, the repercussion of which is a great challenge characterized by the changing and globalized nature of today's society. This demands the development of new skills and new learning models in relation to information and communication technologies. Universities must respond to these social demands in the training of their future professionals. This paper aims to analyze the empirical evidence provided by international studies in (...) the last eleven years, related to the digital literacy of university students, including those pursuing degrees related to the field of education. Our findings highlight the fact that the digital literacy that is offered in universities to graduate/postgraduate students, in addition to treating digital literacy as a central theme, also focuses on perceived and developed self-efficacy. This is done by strengthening competencies related to digital writing and reading, the use of databases, the digital design of content and materials, and the skills to edit, publish or share them on the web, or applications aimed at treating digital literacy as emerging pedagogies and educational innovation. Secondly, we found studies related to digital competencies and use of the Internet, social networks, web 2.0, or the treatment of digital risks and their relationship with digital literacy. Thirdly, we found works that, in addition to focusing on digital literacy, also focused on different psychological constructs such as motivation, commitment, attitudes, or satisfaction.Systematic review registration:https://www.scopus.com/home.uri; https://www.recursoscientificos.fecyt.es/. (shrink)

On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and (...) suggest acceptable approximations. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the origin of the links between global bioethics (which we differentiate from biomedical bioethics) and human rights. We understand that we are in a global civilizational crisis, whose roots extend to 1492 today, in which the modern-capitalist model used the discourse of human rights to justify its predatory technocracy. There are three theoretical assumptions that support our analysis: 1) The current conditions in which the technique shows its destructive power over nature (Anthropocene) indicate that none (...) of the ethical antecedents are applicable to such circumstances. In this new context, the kantian categorical imperative has been reconverted into a moral and political duty to not instrumentalize either human beings or nature. We call this new ethical consideration bioethics. 2) The current geopolitical composition of the world must be thought in terms of the global North and the global South, as two regions that are forged in the midst of important processes of globalization of the world-system, and whose main consequence lies in the absence of equity in the distribution of wealth and well-being between the two. 3) The current environmental crisis or climate change, the product of an economic model based on extractive technology, has become one of the most serious threats against human rights. (shrink)

Defends a version of the Davidsonian Demonstrative Theory of quotation against proponents of the Fregean Identity Theory.

The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...) in the concept of supervenience should be understood as "nomic", not conceptual. Then the paper attempts to show that the usual thought- experiments do not establish that such variety of supervenience does not hold for psychological properties -- at least with regard to a particular, teleo- functional way of interpreting them. (shrink)

This paper defends a version of Davidson’s demonstrative theory of quotation and against against the Fregean identity theory (IT henceforth) as articulated and defended by Corey Washington (1992). On the Fregean view, when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is a linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic (...) context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself. On DT, in contrast, quotation-marks themselves are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. In the version I argue for the referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be: … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the view can deal with the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)